Duquesne Law Review
Volume 45
Number 3 Judicial Review in the Americas ...
and Beyond: Symposium Issue

Article 11

2007

An Essay: Courts, Judicial Review and the Pursuit of Virtue
Bruce A. Antkowiak

Follow this and additional works at: https://dsc.duq.edu/dlr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Bruce A. Antkowiak, An Essay: Courts, Judicial Review and the Pursuit of Virtue, 45 Duq. L. Rev. 467
(2007).
Available at: https://dsc.duq.edu/dlr/vol45/iss3/11

This Symposium Article is brought to you for free and open access by Duquesne Scholarship Collection. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Duquesne Law Review by an authorized editor of Duquesne Scholarship Collection.

An Essay: Courts, Judicial Review and the Pursuit
of Virtue*
Bruce A. Antkowiak**
Academic conferences are, thankfully, not occasions that generally inspire public displays of anger. Academics analyze, opine,
observe, speculate, and call for further study; but, while capable of
engaging in pitched battles when nothing entirely tangible seems
at stake, academics mainly leave public anger to the more visceral
strata of humankind, like trial lawyers.
Hence my problem. Twenty-five years of being a criminal trial
lawyer cannot be wholly cancelled out by five years in academia.
So, honored as I was by the invitation of Professor Robert Barker
to participate in a conference on judicial review and, particularly,
to comment on a presentation by Dr. Allan Brewer-Carfas of
Venezuela, I soon found the old wolf that prowls inside all trial
lawyers rising and clearing his throat. He demands to let loose a
howl of the kind not generally echoing off the walls where symposiums dwell.
Dr. Brewer, you see, is a first class academic, a man whose writings and beliefs have helped form his own nation's Constitution, a
Constitution that may be enforced by the courts of his country in a
multi-layered system of judicial review. He has never led an army
in the field, never plotted the overthrow of anything other than
bad ideas, and never sown the seeds of anything more than a desire that his nation enjoy the freedom its Constitution so earnestly
promises. He carries no plastic explosives in his briefcase and his
bank account does not burst with proceeds of funds stolen from his
national treasury. He is an academic, a danger to anyone only
insofar as his ideas may fire new policies blessed by the democratic processes that would give them life.
And yet, Dr. Brewer cannot go home.
* This essay is based on a presentation made by the author at the symposium on
Judicial Review in the Americas ... and Beyond, Duquesne University, November 10-11,
2006. As always, he thanks his most able research assistant, Julia Charnyshova, for her
valuable assistance and his political theorist in residence, his son, Christian, for his valuable comments and ideas.
** Assistant Professor of Law, Duquesne University.
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The government operating under his Constitution, subject to the
judicial review powers of his courts, would arrest him if he tried.
They would make him a martyr to Constitutional government instead of just the hero of it he is today. So, he cannot go home.
And I am angry about that. And I want to know why. Mostly, I
would like to ask here why systems that seem to have so much
Constitutional government and the judicial review powers to enforce it on paper would allow such a thing to hang over its head or,
for that matter, anyone else's. Obviously, having a Constitution
and judicial review in theory is one thing; making it meaningful
requires something more.
Finding out what that "more" is requires that I channel my anger to an effort at understanding judicial review at its most basic
level. We need to start at the beginning.
Written Constitutions beget judicial review. They are the first
laws, the core laws, principles deemed right, in part, because the
people say they are right. But no matter how beautifully Constitutions are drafted, they are not self-effectuating. The people,
whose authority those documents carry, are not a body in perpetual session, able to assemble regularly to correct or even identify
transgressions of these highest principles.
Some body (or some group) has to be empowered to enforce that
supreme law against the encroachment of other laws that have
cropped up in the normal course of day-to-day governance. Since
the supreme law is, by nature, supreme, the power to say that it
overrides another law is the ultimate political power, the nuclear
alternative, the big stick that one and only one combatant in a
political brawl can wield.
Such a power is to be feared. It is final and reviewable only by
the unusual and not oft-repeated actions of the people from whom
the document sprang in the first place. 1 But it is also inevitable.
Once you have a written Constitution, declaring itself to be the
Summa Lex, then the power of judicial review has to lie some1. As Justice Marshall observed in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803):
That the people have an original right to establish, for their future government,
such principles as, in their opinion, shall most conduce to their own happiness, is the basis, on which the whole American fabric has been erected. The
exercise of this original right is a very great exertion; nor can it, nor ought it to
be frequently repeated. The principles, therefore, so established, are deemed
fundamental. And as the authority, from which they proceed, is supreme, and
can seldom act, they are designed to be permanent.
Marbury, 5 U.S. at 176.
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where. Its existence is a given; where it resides, however, is negotiable.
In the United States, it is an article of faith that it lies in the
Supreme Court. But why do we place the nuclear alternative with
that body? I tell my students that a rough and unofficial categorization of those reasons is as follows:
I. INSTITUTIONAL

A.

The Court is passive; cases come to it.

The big stick should not be wielded by someone who can go out
whenever he wants in search of prey. As we speak, there are
probably hundreds of unconstitutional laws on the books, but until
some party challenges one and the Court overcomes its own rules
of self-restraint 2 to accept the case, the laws remain. The Court
will not forage out, big stick in hand, to hunt them down. Institutionally, that is a good thing.
B.

The Court is detached; it can see a law developed in the crucible of reality.

Fears of a law's unconstitutionality at its enactment may dissipate once the flesh of experience is placed on the bones of its language, allowing the Court to withhold invoking the nuclear alternative in many cases. On the other hand, laws once thought benign may prove particularly mischievous in actually undercutting
core principles, requiring the Court to place its finger on that nuclear button. In either case, reasoned restraint is well served.
C.

The Court is contemplative; it takes time to think.

In the event that the Martians land and invade, courts would be
a terrible place to go for help. By the time briefing schedules and
conferences were held, we would all be compost in a Martian herb
garden. But, courts are very good when the passions of the moment clear and reflection of thought prevails over reaction of the
knee-jerk variety. The carrier of the big stick should be a thoughtful fellow, not given to sudden rage.
2. Here I think of standing, rules about cases deemed moot or not yet ripe, and the
political question doctrine. A bit of deeper reflection would add to this list the preference of
the Court to construe a statute in a way to avoid deeming it unconstitutional. See Jones v.
United States, 529 U.S. 848 (2000).
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II. PROCEDURAL
This was Marshal's view in Marbury.3 A court has to decide on
constitutionality in a case where a party properly raises it as a
defense to the application of a statute. In so doing, of course, a
court must reverse a normal maxim of statutory construction. As
Hamilton points out in Federalist No. 78, 4 more recently passed
acts normally amend and trump the old ones. This is not so if a
Constitution is the older document and a mere statute is the new
one. The Court must then, with reluctance, use a power procedurally thrust upon it.
III. POLITICAL
The Court and our Framers constantly tell us that, the Bill of
Rights notwithstanding, the twin structural pillars of personal
freedom are separation of powers and federalism. 5 Even so junior
a political scientist as myself knows that these are conflict model
devices and that conflict models need some form of external control to be effective. Why?
A.

The players in the politicalgame must be made to play by the
rules.

Anyone who has ever played pick-up basketball knows that
where the outcome of the game holds a lesser priority to the mere
act of playing, enforcement of the rules by the honor system is perfectly adequate. However, where the outcome achieves preeminent importance, a neutral arbiter is needed to give the outcome
legitimacy. As the game of politics always involves outcomes of
3.

Marbury, 5 U.S. at 137. He argued:
It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what
the law is. Those who apply the rule to particular cases, must of necessity expound and interpret that rule. If two laws conflict with each other, the courts
must decide on the operation of each.
So if a law be in opposition to the constitution; if both the law and the constitution apply to a particular case, so that the court must either decide that case
conformably to the law, disregarding the constitution; or conformably to the
constitution, disregarding the law; the court must determine which of these
conflicting rules governs the case. This is of the very essence of judicial duty.
Id. at 177-78.
4. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 467 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., Signet
Classic 2003).
5. Bruce A. Antkowiak, Contemplating Brazilian Federalism:Reflections on the Promise of Liberty, 43 DUQ. L. REV. 599 (2005). In this article emanating from the Law School's
conference on Federalism in the Americas .. . and Beyond, I set out considerable documentation for this point.

Spring 2007

An Essay: The Pursuit of Virtue

471

consummate importance, a referee is a top priority. If a law was
put into effect with only the vote of one house, or if the President
decided that under Article 2 he could seize a steel mill or tap everyone's phone, some neutral party has to step in and call a foul,
saying, in effect, you did not follow the rules of the political game
and for that reason your action cannot be afforded the honorable
title of law.
B.

Moreover, the politicalgame can have devastating effects on
those marginal members of society who can never get to play
but whose interests in not being oppressed by those who do are
most palpable.

Every member of Congress could agree that those who dissent
from a President's asserted power to tap phones should be sent to
internment camps until the war on terror is over. Someone reading our Summa Lex must step in and say that while the political
process proceeded according to its internal rules, that outcome is
one that Lex deems unconscionable. And the Court, with its lifetime appointments and its veneer of non-partisanship, seems the
perfect referee in all respects.
So we have given the Court this fearful power, that big stick,
and we seem to dwell in a euphoric haze that judicial review is
mostly always a power wielded for good. But the power of judicial
review is, like all power, in the strict sense, ethically neutral. The
hammer that builds the home can bash the head of the homeowner. It would serve us to appreciate that our benign assumptions about the use of this power is a view neither universally held
nor historically accepted without challenge.
In his scholarly presentation to this conference, Professor
Brewer has pointed out that judicial review can be a powerful and
diabolical instrument for authoritarianism. 6 And, while Madison
assured his readers that the federal government (Congress) would
be held in check by a watchful judiciary, 7 others writing at the
same time vociferously disagreed.
The Anti-Federalists agreed with the Federalists that the proposed Constitution would necessarily create in one body a supreme authority to interpret the document to supersede the acts of
6. See Allan R. Brewer-Carias, Judicial Review in Venezuela, 45 DUQ. L. REV. 439,
440-65 (2007).
7. THE FEDERALIST No. 44, at 282 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., Signet Classic 2003).
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others and that the federal courts would be that body. They saw
that, however, as a horrible thing indeed.
In a Letter to the Citizens of the State of New York in February,
1788, "Brutus" (New York State Judge Robert Yates) assumed
that the federal judiciary would have the power to "explain the
constitution, not only according to its letter, but according to its
spirit and intention; and having this power, they would strongly
incline to give it such a construction as to extend the powers of the
general government, as much as possible, to the diminution, and
8
finally to the destruction, of that of the respective states."
He argued that the concentration of the power to liberally interpret the expansive language of congressional powers in Article 1,
§8, and the Preamble (with powers granted generally to do things
like "promote the general welfare") into a Judiciary that was itself
part of the federal government, would portend the destruction of
federalism. 9 Because judges would have the power to interpret
the Constitution "not only according to the natural and ob[vious]
meaning of the words but also according to the spirit and intention
of it" and would not be subject to anyone who could vote them out,
they would enjoy a power beyond the Legislature, and be able to
render the states "trifling and unimportant."'10 Nothing, he said,
could have been better conceived to facilitate the abolition of the
states than the judiciary of the federal government."
Give the power of judicial review to the legislators, Yates argued, since if they expanded federal power in an unruly way, they
would do so at their peril on election day. 1 2 Placing it in the
courts, however, left only one, unpleasant, means of control:
But when this power is lodged in the hands of men independent of the people, and of their representatives, and who are
not, constitutionally, accountable for their opinions, no way is
left to control them but with a high hand and an outstretched

arm.13
If we raised that hand and arm to strike down the courts, or to
strip them of the power of judicial review, they would be singu8.

THE ANTI-FEDERALIST PAPERS AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION DEBATES

298 (Ralph Ketcham ed., Signet Classic 2003) (emphasis added).
9. Id. at 299-304.
10. Id. at 304, 307.
11. Id. 308-09.
12. Id. at 309.
13. THE ANTI-FEDERALIST PAPERS, supra note 8, at 309.
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larly ill-equipped to fight back. When its orders are not the subject of voluntary assent, courts must look to the Executive for enforcement. But when, because they have lost the patina of public
integrity we afford them, they must constantly rely on the Executive for that force, courts become mere handmaidens of the Executive, unworthy of the status of a co-equal branch of government.
Hamilton was certainly correct when he observed that with influence neither over the sword nor the purse, "[i]t may truly be
said" that the judiciary has "neither force nor will but merely
judgment .... "14
But in a well-ordered society, one where innocent academics can
go home, the power of judicial review surely cannot rest on the
point of the Executive's bayonet. We may have given courts this
power, but they must keep it by earning our faith in their ability
to guard it well and use it wisely. The Court may not have force
or will, but its judgments do have force to the degree they capture
the will of the people whose Constitution they propound and protect.
There is one, fundamental and solemn way that courts may
perpetually earn and justify their elevated position as the sole repositories of this nuclear alternative. There is something the
courts must do for us in exchange for us not raising the high hand
and outstretched arm, something we should demand as consideration for issuing that big stick.
Courts must earn our faith, and merit the retention of judicial
review, by making their mission the pursuit of virtue.
By virtue, I do not mean merely the "uncommon portion of fortitude ... to do their duty as faithful guardians of the Constitution"
that Hamilton spoke of, 15 or John Adams's hope that judges be
"men of learning and experience in the laws, of exemplary morals,
great patience, calmness, coolness, and attention." 16 Rather, the
virtue of which I speak is the kind described by Montesquieu in
the Spirit of the Laws when he argued that in a successful tyranny, what must be cultivated in the people is the capacity for
fear; in a monarchy, it must be a taste and capacity for honor; but
14. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 464 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., Signet
Classic 2003).
15. Id. at 468.
16.

C. BRADLEY THOMPSON, THE REVOLUTIONARY WRITINGS OF JOHN ADAMS 291-92 (C.

Bradley Thompson ed., Liberty Fund 2000).
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in a republic, what has to be cultivated above all else is virtue:
public, political virtue. 17
For judges, the pursuit of virtue must be manifested by an effort
to reach the foundation of our law, a foundation our Constitution
reflects. Being a person of integrity is, or should be, the expected
disposition of anyone honored by public service; commitment to
the study, exposition and protection of the foundation of the law
requires more. Such a commitment is, however, the least we
should expect from those in whom we have entrusted the ultimate
political power in a constitutional state.
Our law's foundation must be understood as having a deep philosophical core. The core was formed by our Framers and a vast
number of the colonists with whom they shared at least two
things: a communitarian spirit and a passion for the reading of
law.
Edmund Burke, in addressing his colleagues in Parliament and
warning of the forthcoming American Revolution, related that
London booksellers claimed to have sold more books to the colonies than to all of Great Britain.' 8 A vast number of those books
were law books, books that spoke of a deeply moral basis to law, a
basis that required men to look beyond the mere words of positive
law for the true source of legitimacy in reason, and from reason, to
obtain a glimpse of natural law, the transcendent end of the lawmaker's journey.
The Enlightenment theory prevalent at the time spoke to conceptions of natural law that led the Colonists to believe they were
all "tied to a proposition that a providential God had fitted us out
to recognize principles of justice" through the capacity to reason.19
Reason may have displaced an older, theological mandate as the
philosophical force behind political society but it hardly stripped
that society of its moral component; limited government did not
mean an amoral one. 20 Lockean notions of social contract, the rule
of law and the pursuit of the common good were the products of
reason but not ends in and of themselves. They were the frame-

17. This rendering and much of the discussion that immediately follows is informed by
Professor Daniel N. Robinson's wonderful lectures entitled "American Ideals: Founding a
'Republic of Virtue."' DANIEL N. ROBINSON, AMERICAN IDEALS: FOUNDING A "REPUBLIC OF
VIRTUE" (The Teaching Company 2004).
18. Id. at 14-15.
19. Id. at 15
20. I have written about this more extensively in JudicialNullification. Bruce A. Antkowiak, Judicial Nullification, 38 CREIGHTON L. REV. 545, 570-79 (2005).
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work to allow for the pursuit of higher values and the tracking
21
down of that most elusive of commodities, the truth.
The Framers read the sixteenth century theologian Richard
Hooker who told them that "the spirit leadeth men into all truth"
in one of two ways, "the one belonging but unto some few, the
other extending itself unto all that are of God; the one that which
we call by a special divine excellency Revelation, the other Reason."22 They knew that Martin Luther had admonished that:
No matter how good and equitable the laws are, they all make
exceptions of cases of necessity, in which they cannot be enforced. Therefore a prince must have the law in hand as
firmly as the sword, and decide in his own mind when and
where the law must be applied strictly or with moderation, so
that reason may always control all law and be the highest law
3
and rule over all laws. 2
Positive laws of any kind would have intrinsic legitimacy only
insofar as they "measure up correctly with reason itself."24 The
Constitution itself was seen as a written expression of a search for
the best reason can give us. It also represented an ongoing mandate for that search that judges are bound to undertake as a necessary component of their institutional legitimacy.
Our Framers rejected the notion that judges are mere functionaries bound to apply laws with only a dictionary to guide them.
They would have repudiated judges in Nazi Germany who, with
shrugged shoulders, applied laws mechanically under the axiom
"gesetz ist gesetz. '' 25 They would tell judges today that reading the
words of the Constitution is the first, but only the first, aspect of
the pursuit of virtue, which is the ultimate role of the Court.
Pursuing virtue means understanding that the Constitution is
no mere law, enacted as a result of a particular and temporary
political stimulus. While the Declaration of Independence was a
statement of reasons to break from Britain, the Constitution is a
21.
22.

Id.
RICHARD HOOKER, OF THE LAWS OF ECCLESIASTICAL POLITY 16 (Arthur Stephen

McGrade ed., Cambridge University Press 2004).
23.

MARTIN LUTHER, MARTIN LUTHER: SELECTION FROM His WRITINGS, 393 (John Dil-

lenberger ed., Anchor Press 1962) (emphasis added). John Calvin, too, had' spoken of his
philosophy in natural law terms, but not as merely a product of common reason; rather, it
was "the voice of conscience." ROBERT L. REYMOND, JOHN CALVIN: HIS LIFE AND INFLUENCE

107 (Robert L. Reymond ed., Christian Focus 2004).
24.

ROBINSON, supra note 17, at 15.

25.

"Law is law." Id. at 45.
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statement of reason, a moral judgment deriving from an attempt
by citizens to use their self-evident capacity to reason to find a law
of nature, a law of transcendent origin, a law true in good times
and bad, in moments of calm and in moments of passion and turmoil. The Constitution embodies principles that are right not only
because the People said they were right, but embodies those principles because they are right. They are right because they derive
from a process that is the best one human beings can use to develop a system of self rule; a process that requires levels of
thought beyond the cursory reading of words on a page; a process
meant to last and outlast the societal nuances of a late eighteenthcentury time capsule; a process that counsels that core beliefs of a
reasoned people are not repudiated when wisdom gleaned from
experience applies those beliefs in ways the passing of ancient
prejudices heretofore have made impossible; a process that yearns
for, and takes us as close as possible to, the permanent, transcendent truth our Framers so earnestly believed was there to find.
Hamilton thus could easily argue that "whenever a momentary
inclination happens to lay hold of a majority of their constituents
incompatible with the provisions in the existing Constitution" or
where infractions "proceeded wholly from the cabals of the representative body", 26 the Court has a mandate to step in and assert
those principles and the reasoned process that brought them
about. In so doing, the Court does not elevate itself over other political bodies; rather, it simply gives continuing recognition to the
supremacy of the intent of the people over the desires of their
agents.27
Courts have to realize that the drafting of the Constitution was
itself an act in the pursuit of virtue, and the entity given the
power to enforce it must continue that pursuit if it wishes to preserve its claim to legitimacy.
This is not a license for the Court to act in elitist ways. Philosophy may be needed, but not philosopher kings. The Court must
understand that in a system born out of the consent of the governed, wisdom lies in the voice of the people when they spoke in
their most able and pure form, when the best of what they believed their reason could achieve was articulated. The Court must
seek to understand the reasoningprocess that led to the adoption
of the principles a rational people used to order their society for
26. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 468 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., Signet
Classic 2003).
27. Id. at 466-68.
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their individual and common good. That process is the undercurrent to the words used in the articulation that is the Constitution.
That process is, and was meant to be, an ongoing one. That is
what we mean when we say that ours is a "living Constitution."
How should a court try to understand that process?
To be sure, the courts need to read David Hume, John Locke
and John Adams, and papers Federalist and Anti-Federalist. But
they must also read a contemporary political theorist whose work
lays out a rational process for nation building that renders artfully
the Enlightenment idea that reason is the gateway to both a
deeper truth and a well-ordered society. His formulation describes
in modern terms the essential thought of the Framers and suggests that justice, in tangible measure, is possible by its application.
In Political Liberalism, John Rawls tells us that when the people exercise their power to establish a new government, they set
up a "higher law," one that has the direct authority "of the will of
We the People," a law that "binds and guides" the ordinary power
their government exercises in everyday law-making. 28
That
higher law is embodied in a democratic constitution, something
that is "a principled expression ... of the political ideal of the people to govern itself in a certain way" and something that is the
"aim of public reason ... to articulate." 29
But where do these principles so expressed come from? They
proceed from an agreement among "free and equal citizens" who
negotiate them rationally, seeking their "reciprocal advantage."
That agreement arises in the first instance in Rawls's famous
"though experiment," the "original position." 30 It is a process that
resonates and echoes much of the philosophical thought that was
given voice in our own Constitution.
Rawls posits a group of people coming together before their society is formed to lay down the principles they will deem most fundamental in the operation of that society once it is created. The
28. JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 231-40 (Columbia University Press 1993). I
have written more extensively about Rawls in Saving Probable Cause, an article to be published the Spring of 2007 in the Suffolk University Law Review.
29. Id.
30.

JOHN RAwLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS: A RESTATEMENT (Erin Kelly ed., The Belknap

Press of Harvard University Press 2001). Rawls never thought such a "thought experiment" ever actually occurred, but the Philadelphia Convention of 1787 has more than a few
parallels.
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process used to generate those principles, and the rules to enforce
them, show them to be the best they have to give as reasoning
people. The process has four aspects:
(1) Rules are written rationally, using the best faculties of those
who adopted them;
(2) Rules are written dispassionately, before exigencies cloud
judgment, but with an awareness that exigencies will arise in the
course of societal governance. Rules properly drafted can be applied in times of exigencies to preserve the society without sacrificing its soul in the process. The rules are no suicide pact embraced
by idealists; they are rules for realists, realists who believe that
government can free them to the higher pursuits of spiritual
growth in a manner of their own choosing;
(3) Rules are written with self interest in mind, as the rulemakers seek to live in the society their rules will govern; and,
critically,
(4) Rules are written blindly, behind Rawls's "veil of ignorance."
They are agreed upon by people who do not know what station in
life they will occupy once the rules they all agree to live by are enacted. No matter whom the rule-maker turns out to be once the
veil of ignorance is lifted, he must know that he can live with dignity in the world his rules will govern. The rules become principles no one can live without no matter who they are in society.
The veil of ignorance thus changes the self-interested nature of
the decision making from an exercise in selfishness to one of pub31
lic-mindedness and, indeed, civic virtue.
What comes from behind the veil, what is written into our Constitution, is a sense of a shared, common good that is then publicly
32
affirmed in a process of consensus Rawls calls "public reason."
The principles so formed become part of the value of public reason
in a constitutional democracy as an embracing of a core through a
31.

JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS: A RESTATEMENT (Erin Kelly ed., The Belknap

Press of Harvard University Press 2001); JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (The Belknap
Press of Harvard University Press 1971); John Rawls, Justice as Fairness, 67 PHIL. REV.
164 (1958). An excellent rendering of Rawls's theory of justice in this regard is presented
by Professor Samuel Gorrowitz in his essay John Rawls'A Theory of Justice, reproduced in
CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL PHILOSOPHERS 272 (Dodd, Mead & Co. New York 1975).
32. RAWLS, supra note 28, at 231.
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spirit of reciprocity that is the foundation of a democratic society. 33 This consensus is the product of the rational forces that
formed society and must be exercised in an ongoing way through
time. The pursuit of virtue requires judges to seek the terms and
process of that consensus, and not the mere words inked on an
ancient parchment.
In Rawls's well-ordered society, the Supreme Court must "give
due and continuing effect to public reason by serving as its institutional exemplar." 34 Indeed, he calls the Court "the only branch of
government that is visibly on its face the creature of that reason
and of that reason alone," and the Court must "protect the higher
law," by checking manipulations of law-makers that threaten the
vitality of that higher law. 35
In doing this, the Court is not being antidemocratic. It is being
anti-majoritarian with respect to ordinary law, but the higher authority of the people supports that. The Court is not antimajoritarian with respect to higher law, as the Constitution is the
36
first and most important product of the democratic process.
We must therefore demand that the Court act as a conscience,
reminding a troubled majority of the values it established at a
time when reason and a fundamentally moral process produced a
consensus on values that were meant to endure. The Constitution
is the first and most noble act of this Democracy, and the Court
serves democracy best when it enforces that charter and the ongoing process that produced it with fidelity.
Judges, Rawls intones, serve best when they appeal "to the political values they think belong to the most reasonable understanding of the public conception and its political values of justice
and public reason . . .[values] that all citizens as reasonable and
rational might reasonably be expected to endorse." 37 That is the
pursuit of virtue.
If they fail in this pursuit, the reasoned judgment of the people
may eventually correct them, but the Court will have lost its legitimacy in the process. Rawls observes that "[t]he constitution is
not what the Court says it is. Rather, it is what the people acting

33.

CHARLES LARMORE, THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO RAWLS: PUBLIC REASON 368

(Samuel Freeman ed., Cambridge University Press 2005).
34. RAWLS, supra note 28, at 235.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 233-34.
37. Id. at 236.
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constitutionally . . . allow the Court to say it is."' 38 Justice John
Harlan, in his dissent in Poe v. Ullman,39 agreed.
Due process, Justice Harlan wrote, derives from a rational process of balancing personal liberty and the needs of social order.
But the process is not one where judges are-free to roam at their
whim, going wherever unguided speculation might take them.
The balance is the product of the traditions judges must appreciate, some developing in the here and now, some freshly broken in
light of a new, reasoned consensus. The process is as organic as it
is rational: "That tradition is a living thing. A decision of this
Court which radically departs from it could not long survive, while
a decision which builds on what has survived is likely to be
40
sound."
Our shared values thus work like political gravity, pulling errant legal decisions down to the plane of popular consensus. That
gravity works its magical, corrective function though, only when
democratic institutions are functioning as their makers intended.
Federalism, separation of powers, and publicly acknowledged human rights, all enforced by courts not controlled solely by transient majoritarian forces, are necessary prerequisites for these
gravitational forces to function effectively.
Judges, though, should not wait for other forces in society to
correct their failure to uphold the core principles in the Constitution. Extra-judicial correction of the courts' failures can result in
long periods of needless oppression and render the courts permanently ineffective to play their crucial role. Judges need always to
understand that the core of justice is the pursuit of virtue, a pursuit founded upon and requiring the constant exercise of reason to
appreciate the nature of the ongoing societal consensus that underlies it. By seeking virtue, the Court will find itself coming
home to reason.
We grant large amounts of judicial independence so courts may
make this journey. The American patriot Arthur Lee called liberty the parent of virtue, 4 1 and creating institutional safeguards
to free the Court to perform its crucial role is surely necessary.
Indeed, Thomas Paine reminded us that reliance upon the individual integrity of public office holders was not the most efficacious way to ensure the long-term health of a republic. "When we
38.
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40.

Id. at 237-38.
367 U.S. 497, 522 (1961).
Poe, 367 U.S. at 542.

41.
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are planning for posterity," he wrote in Common Sense, "we ought
42
to remember that virtue is not hereditary."
But judicial independence is something we should only tender
with a clear expectation of receiving something of great value in
return. Like the big stick, it is a commodity to be purchased in the
currency of a faithful commitment to an ongoing and singularly
focused pursuit of virtue. We must demand that this pursuit be a
vigorous one. We must look to the courts and say, in Milton's
words:
I cannot praise a fugitive and cloistered virtue, unexercised
and unbreathed, that never sallies out and sees her adversary
but slinks out of the race, where that immortal garland is to
be run for, not without dust and heat. 43
Dr. Brewer has run that race. He bears the dust and most
surely feels the heat. Can any of us who cares about the virtue we
hope underlies our system pursue it with anything short of that
intense breed of constitutional passion? Can any of us shrink
from anger at the failure of courts anywhere to pursue it?
That passion and that anger will not go unrewarded. If, by
their expression, courts turn to the singular pursuit of virtue as
their institutional mandate, then, someday, we will all be able to
go home again.

42. THOMAS PAINE, COMMON SENSE 110 (Isaac Kramnick ed., Penguin Books 1982).
43. JOHN MILTON, AREOPAGITICA: A SPEECH OF MR. JOHN MILTON FOR THE LIBERTY OF
UNLICENSED PRINTING 15 (Adamant Media Corp. 2000).

